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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS: SOME RECENT
PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY
DAVID W. PAULSEN
Goodrich Program and Dept. of Philosophy and Religion
University of Nebraska at Omaha 68132

1. lntroduction. A standard treatment of functional analysis ("functionalism") among philosophers of science has recently come under attack by a
new variety of "functionalist" in the philosophy of psychology.l Jerry
Fodor, the chief proponent of this new approach, challenges the view that
functional statements can be eliminated in favor of causal (nomological)
statements. He supports his position by providing the outlines of a functional
analysis of mental concepts which he believes illuminates the mind-body
problem. In particular, Fodor holds that his version of functionalism clarifies
hoW a materialist may avoid adherence to the reductionist thesis that mental
concepts can be eliminated in favor of physical concepts. 2
F odor's criticism of the "standard view" of functional analysis is
blunted, however, in two ways. (a) The parallel between the standard
treatment and Fodor's variant breaks down in a crucial manner. Consequently, even if he establishes that functional statements as he construes them
cannot be eliminated in favor of causal statements, he has not yet shown that
functional statements as construed by the standard view are ineliminable. (b)
Many of the virtues of Fodor's account, particularly as it avoids reductionist
solutions to the mind-body problem, can be obtained without recourse to the
troublesome concept of a function.
2. Fodor's Account. According to Fodor, a complete explanation in
psychology consists of two parts: a functional analysis and a mechanistic or
casual analysis. 3 A phase one theory provides a functional characterization of
"internal states" of an organism such as memories, motives, needs, drives,
desires, strategies, beliefs, etc. solely in terms of the way in which they
function in producing behavior. Such theories attribute only those properties
and degree of complexity to internal states of an organism necessary to
account for some part of its behavior and make no reference to
neurophysiological conditions or structures. 4 An example of such a phase one
theory is the use of concepts like memory trace, long-term memory and
short-term memory in order to account for human memory evincing
behavior. 5 Such a theory does not provide a causal explanation, it is asserted,
although it may provide the basis for predicting human behavior given
sufficient knowledge about stimulus conditions. 6
A phase two theory, on the other hand, may well provide a causal
explanation for behavior by postulating a mechanism capable of producing
this behavior. A neurological theory, for instance, may be developed which
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introduces a physiological condition responsible for the memory capacities of
human beings characterized by the memory hypothesis which is cast in
functional/psychological concepts. Whether there is such a mechanism is itself
an empirical question.
The two types of theory are brought together by showing them to be
"functionally equivalent," i.e. by establishing that the behavioral consequences of the mechanism postulated by the phase two theory are the same
in relevant respects as the behavior which characterizes psychological states in
the phase one theory. 7 How this functional equivalence is to be demonstrated
in any specific case is not clearly indicated, but Fodor is sure that there is no
way of translating ''11 and <I> are functionally equivalent' into'll and <I> are
each causal conditions for B" (where ''11' IS replaced by some functional/
psychological expression, '<I>' by some neurophysiological description and 'B'
by some description of behavior).8 Such a conclusion follows directly from
the claim that the connection between functionally characterized internal
mental states and behavior is not causal. Both phases of the theory are
necessary for an adequate psychology, and neither is eliminable. A functional
analysis is, therefore, a necessary and ineliminable part of any respectable
scientific explanation of human behavior.
The consequences of Fodor's account for the theory of mind emerge
when we consider the character and connection between phase one and phase
two theories. He illustrates the relationship by pointing to the difference
between describing a device as a valve-lifter and speaking of it as a camshaft. 9
To say that something is a valve-lifter is to describe it in terms of its function,
and for this reason it is inappropriate to ask "What does a valve-lifter consist
of?" where this is a request for a specification on physical parts. The term
'camshaft,' however, comes from our physical object vocabulary. Camshafts
consist of rods, springs and atoms. It follows from similar considerations that
no reductionist account of the mind-body relation is possible. As in the
valve-lifter/camshaft example, psychological (Le. functional) states are not
susceptible to reduction in the sense of microanalysis in terms of physical
components.
Furthermore, just as there may be different kinds of physical objects
which provide a mechanism for lifting valves, so too there may be different
mechanisms functionally equivalent to some psychological state described by
a phase one theory. It may even be the case that certain psychological states
can be realized both by neurophysiological and electronic mechanisms.
Hence, even if a certain neurophysiological mechanism is found to be
functionally equivalent to a psychological state or process, no reduction is
available, as it would remain possible that some other neurological or
electronic mechanism could equally well realize it.
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3. The "standard view. " Although philosophers of science have sometimes
cited functional analyses in psychology (e.g. by mentioning that Freudian
psychology treats symptom formation as functioning to avoid anxiety),
proponents of the standard view more usually focus on the methods
promoted by sociologists such as Merton or anthropologists such as
Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, who utilize functional analysis in strictly
social contexts. 1 0
Characteristically, these functional analyses are seen as attempting to
provide explanations for certain social or cultural items in terms of the role
(function) they have in satisfying certain basic needs (functional prerequisites) necessary for the survival or viability of a social group. The functional
analyses proffered by social scientists are measured against the requirements
for explanation inheren t in the covering law model. According to this model
statements describing items to be explained must follow deductively from a
set of premises which include general empirical laws as well as statements of
particular facts. 1 1 In order to fulfill these requirements it is necessary to
reconstruct functional analyses by replacing functional statements with causal
(nomological) statements. For example, Radcliffe-Brown's suggestion that
totemic rites among certain Australian tribes have the social function of
supporting a body of cosmological ideas which enable the tribe to survive is
recast as asserting that totemic rites are traits causally sufficient for
maintaining states necessary to the continued survival of the tribe. 1 2
Examination of such reconstructions, however, often leads to the
conclusion that the functional analysis given provides an inadequate
explanation. The social account may fail the deductivity requirement because
the item to be explained (in the example above, totemic rites) is only one
among a number of possible ways in which a social need can be satisfied (i.e.
one among a number of functionally equivalent items). Alternatively, it may
be unacceptable because claims about the needs (functional prerequisites) of
the social group in question cannot be reformulated as general empirical laws.
For these reasons, the standard view holds that functional analyses of social
phenomena have usually not been scientifically respectable (meaning in part
that they do not satisfy the requirements of the covering law model of
scientific explanation). Rather, they are thought to have at best a heuristic
role in directing inquiry to possible self-regulative aspects of social systems. 1 3
Furthermore, success in eliminating functional statements in biology in
favor of statements about homeostatically controlled systems are held by the
proponents of the standard view to offer hope that functional analyses in the
social sciences can be rendered scientifically respectable by reconstructions
Which locate social items within a causal analysis of the social group as a
self-regulating system.
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4. Criticism. (a) Fodor's account of functional analysis and that offered by
the standard view appear to clash over the issue of whether functional
statements can be eliminated in favor of causal statements, and further
whether they can be "scientifically respectable" even if they cannot be
eliminated. This conflict dissipates, however, if we note crucial differences
between the kinds of analyses which are considered functional.
For the standard view functional analyses in psychology are typically
found when an attempt is made to account for some recurrent piece Or
pattern of behavior (e.g. hysterical paralysis) by pointing out its function in
the larger system of a person's psychological states (e.g. how it relieves
unconscious anxiety about being drafted).14 In contrast, Fodor is concerned
with a functional analysis not of behavior itself, but rather of the
psychological states lying behind behavior.
F or the standard view a functional analysis purports to provide a
"functional explanation" of an item which can be identified and individuated
in a relatively unproblematic way (i.e. an item which is "observable") such as
totemic rites or hysterical paralysis. Fodor, however, construes a functional
analysis as what might more appropriately be called a "functional description." The objects of functional analysis for him are theoretical constructs
which are described in terms of their behavioral (i.e. observable) manifestations, though they are not themselves directly observable. He is not
concerned with explaining these psychological states.
The standard view demands reconstruction of functional statements by
means of causal (nomological) statements precisely because they purport to
provide explanations. Proponents are not committed to the view that the
different kind of statements indicating the relation between terms in a theory
and its evidential or observational base must be eliminated in favor of causal
statements. Indeed, they take pains to point out that many of the theoretical
terms used by social scientists are faulty because they have not been
adequately related to observational or operational concepts. Fodor appears to
be talking about "functional analysis" in a way in which other philosophers
of science talk about "correspondence rules," "coordinative definitions,"
"partial definitions" or "bridge principles." 1 5 Construed in this way, there is
no substantive conflict between Fodor's account of functional analysis and
that offered by the standard view. Proponents of the standard view are willing
to acknowledge the importance of operationalizing psychological concepts in
terms of behavior, admit that statements providing this connection cannot be
eliminated in favor of causal statements and agree that such statements are a
necessary part of any respectable scientific theory. Such admissions, however,
leave untouched their claim that functional explanations need to be recast in
causal language.
(b) The advantages provided by Fodor's use of the concept of functional
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analysis do not spring from their analogy with other uses of the confusing
concept of a function. The important difference between describing
something as a valve-lifter and describing it as a camshaft, need not be
construed as obtaining because the first is a description in terms of function
and the second is not. It is, after all, not obvious that the relationship
between being a valve-lifter and valve-lifting behavior is similar to that
between long-term memory and the behavior which manifests it. What is
important in such an example is not the specific difference between a
functional description and a non-functional description, but the fact that we
have two different and conceptually distinct alternative descriptions provided
for the same object.
As applied to psychological explanation, Fodor's insights are captured
without recourse to a discussion of functional analysis by views like those of
Donald Davidson who offers a version of the Contingent Identity Theory of
Mind which capitalizes on the notion of alternative descriptions of the same
event. 16
According to such theories, mental and physical language are treated as
providing different concepts for the purpose of individuating events. It is
possible, however, to determine in some cases that the events, states or
processes described in terms of one vocabulary are contingently identical with
those described in the other. Nevertheless, it is argued, there may be no
psychophysical laws or definitions and hence no prospect of reducing mental
concepts to physical concepts.! 7
This theory shares a further asset and also a liability with Fodor's
account. First, it allows us to understand why difficulties arise concerning
"causal" statements cast in terms of psychological expressions and descriptions of behavior. We fault the statement that the soporific material that a
man ingested caused him to fall asleep because the generalization of which it
is an instance is not a genuine causal law. It is not a causal law because of the
definitional connection between 'soporific power' and 'putting people to
sleep.' It remains possible, of course, that under another description of the
material ingested we would have an instance of a genuine causal law. 1 8 A
similar situation may exist when the connection is conceptual as when the
terms of a psychological theory are cashed out by means of descriptions of
behavior. There may be no causal laws connecting psychological states with
behavior when these states are described in psychological terms, although
there could be such laws when these states are given alternative descriptions
in a neurophysical vocabulary.
Second, Fodor is candid about the difficulties that arise when we try to
determine functional equivalence. They spring from problems about the
concept of having consequences that are the same in relevant respects. These
are some of the same difficulties that arise when we try to spell out
139
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conditions for individuating events, since events under descriptions are
distinguished in part by having the same or different causes and effects Or
consequences.
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